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Abstract
We use Hotelling’s spatial model of competition to investigate the position-
taking behaviour of political candidates under a class of electoral systems
known as scoring rules. In a scoring rule election, voters rank all the candi-
dates running for office, following which the candidates are assigned points
according to a vector of nonincreasing scores. Convergent Nash equilibria
in which all candidates adopt the same policy were characterised by Cox
[5]. Here, we investigate nonconvergent equilibria, where candidates adopt
divergent policies. We identify a number of classes of scoring rules exhibiting
a range of different equilibrium properties. For some of these, nonconver-
gent equilibria do not exist. For others, nonconvergent equilibria in which
candidates cluster at positions spread across the issue space are observed.
In particular, we prove that the class of convex rules does not have Nash
equilibria (convergent or nonconvergent) with the exception of some deriva-
tives of Borda rule. Finally, we examine the special cases of four-, five- and
six- candidate elections. In the former two cases, we provide a complete
characterisation of nonconvergent equilibria.
1 Introduction
Hotelling’s [12] spatial model of competition, first introduced in 1929, has had a
large and varied influence on a number of fields. It has been applied not only in
the original context of firms selecting geographic locations along “Main Street” so
as to maximise their share of the market, but also to that of producers deciding on
how much variety to incorporate into their products [3]. Downs [9] has adapted
it with minor modifications to model an election: in particular, the ideological
position-taking behaviour of political candidates in their effort to win votes.
The model in its simplest form features a number of candidates (firms) adopt-
ing positions on a one-dimensional manifold, usually taken to be the interval
[0, 1], along which the voters’ ideal positions (consumers) are distributed. The
preferences of the voters over the candidates are then determined by the distance
between their own ideal positions and those advocated by the candidates. The
candidates adopt positions so as to maximise their share of the vote (market).1
In the economic interpretation of this model where firms compete for market
share, competition on price is excluded and customers buy from the closest firm
to minimise transportation costs.
1See Stigler’s [22] argumentation for this assumption and a discussion of it in [8].
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In the majority of the literature, the voters only have one vote, which they
allocate to their favourite candidate. That is, the electoral system is taken to be
plurality rule. The voters’ second, third and other preferences do not come into
play. Economically, this is akin to saying customers only patronise the nearest
firm, with the distribution of the more distant firms being irrelevant to them.
In many situations, however, preferences other than first do indeed matter.
Far from all elections are held under plurality rule: electoral systems, both in use
and theoretical, are diverse. So too are the incentives that candidates are faced
with under different electoral systems—what is the optimal strategy under one
system may be subpar under a different one. One very general class of electoral
systems that take into account more than just the voters’ single most preferred
candidate are the scoring rules.
In an election held under a scoring rule, each voter submits a preference rank-
ing of all m candidates running for office, whereby si points are assigned to the
candidate in the ith position on the voter’s ranking. Thus, we specify a scor-
ing rule by an m-vector of real nonnegative numbers, s = (s1, . . . , sm), with
s1 ≥ · · · ≥ sm ≥ 0 and s1 > sm. Well-known examples of scoring rules include
plurality, Borda’s rule and antiplurality, given by score vectors s = (1, 0, . . . , 0),
s = (m−1,m−2, . . . , 0) and s = (1, . . . , 1, 0), respectively. Different score vectors
may define the same scoring rule. In particular, an affine transformation of the
score vector s′ = (αs1 + β, . . . , αsm + β), where α > 0 and β are real numbers,
defines the same rule as s.
In the election—according to Stigler’s thesis—the candidates adopt positions
with the aim of maximising the total number of points received from all the elec-
torate and hence, one would expect, the equilibrium strategies will depend on the
particular scoring rule in use. This dependence is the focus of our investigation.
This is not the only possible interpretation of the scoring rule. Another plau-
sible view, due to Cox [6], is that the coordinates of the score vector represent
probabilities: if we normalise the score vector s so that the sum of its coordinates
is 1, si can now be seen as the likelihood that a voter votes for the ith nearest
candidate. Indeed, ideological proximity is not the only factor at the ballot box:
a single issue out of many may put a voter off a candidate who, on the whole, is
of a similar ideological bent; or, it could simply be down to personal charisma,
experience, prejudice or any number of other similar nonpolicy reasons. In the
economic interpretation, it is also natural to assume that consumers patronise
more distant firms with some probability—occasionally, it turns out to be more
convenient to purchase from a more distant firm simply because one happens to
be passing through the vicinity, for example. The probability implied by such
an interpretation is of an ordinal nature—there is no dependency on absolute
distance, as occurs in most of the extant literature on probabilistic voting (see,
e.g., [4, 10]).
As mentioned, most of the literature considers the case of plurality elections.
Exceptions are Cox [5] and Myerson [17], who consider a number of alternative
electoral systems, including scoring rules. Cox, in particular, provides a valuable
characterisation of convergent Nash equilibria (CNE), that is, equilibria in which
all candidates adopt the same policy position (see Theorem 2.4 of this paper for
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the precise formulation). He identifies three classes to which a scoring rule may
belong: “best-rewarding” rules which never possess CNE; “worst-punishing” rules
which, to the contrary, do allow CNE in which all candidates adopt a position
located within a certain interval; and, an intermediate case between the two, for
which a unique CNE exists at the median voter’s ideal position.
As one infers from the nomenclature, under each of these three classes of
scoring rules candidates are faced with different incentives. Myerson [17, p. 677]—
who introduced the terminology we are using2—explains the competing incentives
as follows: under a best-rewarding rule, “the candidate gains more from moving
up in the preferences of voters who currently rank her near the top”; on the
contrary, under a worst-punishing rule “the candidate gains more from moving
up in the preferences of voters who currently rank her near the bottom.”
Cox stopped short of investigating the existence of nonconvergent Nash equi-
libria (NCNE) for general scoring rules, i.e., those equilibria in which the positions
adopted by the candidates are not all the same. For plurality, however, the situ-
ation is well-studied and a full characterisation of NCNE is given by Eaton and
Lipsey [11] and Denzau et al. [8]. The nonexistence of NCNE for antiplurality is
also known, as Cox [5, p. 93] points out. For general scoring rules, however, the
picture is unclear, and little work has been done in this direction. Cox conjectures
[5, p. 93] that “nonconvergent equilibria are at best rare for [worst-punishing]
scoring functions, but that they are fairly common for [best-rewarding] scoring
functions.” We look to fill this gap in the literature.
Since a general characterisation of NCNE appears to be intractable, our ap-
proach is to consider the problem in large classes of rules satisfying various addi-
tional conditions. For several broad classes of scoring rules, we find that NCNE
do not exist at all or seldom exist. For rules having scores that are convex (de-
crease more rapidly at the top end of the score vector than at the bottom end),
NCNE are impossible except for some derivatives of Borda rule (Theorem 4.3).
For rules whose scores are concave (decrease more rapidly at the bottom end of
the score vector than at the top end) we do not have such a perfect answer. Our
results for this class of rules are applicable to a larger class of weakly concave
rules: we prove that if an NCNE exists, then it should be highly asymmetric
(Theorem 4.7) and we showed that such asymmetric equilibria for some weakly
concave rules do indeed exist (Example 4.11). The existence of NCNE for rules
with concave scores remain an intriguing open question. We also look at a class
of rules that are highly best-rewarding, that is, the reward for being ranked first
by voters is particularly large relative to other rankings. For these rules as well,
no NCNE exist (Theorem 4.13).
On the other hand, two other classes investigated, amongst others, do allow
NCNE and we can calculate many of them. We identify a class of rules allowing
NCNE with multiple candidates clustered more or less evenly along the issue space
(Theorem 5.5). We also characterize NCNE in which there are two symmetrically
located clusters with the same number of candidates (Theorem 5.10).
2 In [6], Cox refers to “first-place rewarding”, “intermediate” and “last-place punishing”
rules.
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In the special cases of four- and five-candidate elections, things are simpler and
we are able to provide a complete characterisation of the rules allowing NCNE
(Theorems 6.1 and 6.3). We also examine six-candidate elections (Theorem 6.4).
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. First, we introduce notation
and the main assumptions of our model in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we
derive some preliminary results before moving on to investigate rules that do not
allow NCNE in Section 4. Next, in Section 5, we look at rules that do admit
NCNE. In Section 6, we turn our attention to the special cases of four-, five- and
six-candidate elections. In Section 7 we briefly outline the algorithm we used for
finding NCNE computationally. Finally, we briefly review the related literature
in Section 8, and Section 9 concludes.
2 The model
In our model there is a continuum of voters, assumed to have ideal positions
uniformly distributed3 on the interval [0, 1], the issue space, on which candidates
adopt positions. Since the two- and three-candidate cases are well-known—in
the first we have the classical median voter result, and in the latter case no
NCNE exist (see the end of this section)—we assume there are m ≥ 4 candidates.
Candidate i’s position is denoted xi and a strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈
[0, 1]m specifies the positions adopted by all the candidates. For a given strategy
profile x, denote by x1, . . . , xq the distinct positions that appear in x, labelled so
that x1 < · · · < xq. In an NCNE, we will always have q ≥ 2. Let ni ∈ N denote
the number of candidates adopting position xi. Then we have
∑q
i=1 ni = m.
Given a strategy profile x, we will often use the equivalent notation
x = ((x1, n1), . . . , (x
q, nq)).
We also use the notation [n] = {1, . . . , n} and if I = [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1] is an interval
with end points a < b, its length is denoted `(I) = b− a and this is the measure
of voters in the interval, since the distribution is uniform.
We assume the voters are not strategic and have single-peaked, symmetric
utility functions. Hence, a voter ranks the candidates according to the distance
between her own personal ideal position and the positions adopted by the candi-
dates. If ni ≥ 2, that is, two or more candidates adopt position xi, then all voters
will be indifferent between these candidates. However, the scoring rule requires
that they submit a strict ranking. In this case, a voter separates these candidates
in her ranking by means of a fair lottery. Thus, for example, if xi is the position
nearest to a given voter’s ideal position, the voter allocates the first ni places in
her ranking randomly, with each candidate at xi having a probability of 1/ni of
being assigned any one of these places.4 Note that we assume voters can only
ever be indifferent between candidates if they occupy the same position.
3The voters’ ideal positions need not actually be uniformly distributed. As has been pointed
out in other papers such as [2], it is enough that the candidates believe the distribution to be
uniform or are working under this simplifying assumption.
4Alternatively we could allow indifferences on voters’ ballots and modify the scoring rule
accordingly.
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Figure 1: The situation in Example 2.1
Candidate i’s score, vi(x), is the total number of points received on integrating
across all voters. The candidates are assumed to maximise vi(x)—that is, they
are score (share) maximisers. Information is assumed to be complete and no
candidate has an advantage—they all adopt positions simultaneously.
We hope that the following example will aid the reader in understanding how
scores are calculated for a given configuration of candidate positions.
Example 2.1. Consider a three-candidate election contested between candidates
i, j and k and held under a scoring rule s = (s1, s2, s3). Consider the profile x =
((x1, 2), (x2, 1)), where xi = xj = x
1 and xk = x
2. This situation is illustrated in
Figure 1. The voters in the interval I1 = [0, (x
1 + x2)/2] are indifferent between
candidates i and j, but prefer them both to k. The voters in the interval I2 =
[(x1+x2)/2, 1] have k as their unique favourite candidate, and they are indifferent
between i and j. Then i and j both receive the score
vi(x) = vj(x) =
(
s1 + s2
2
)
`(I1) +
(
s2 + s3
2
)
`(I2).
The first term comes from the fact that all voters in I1 flip a coin to decide
whether to rank i first and j second, or the other way around. Hence, i receives
s1 from half these voters and s2 from the other half. The second term follows
from similar considerations with respect to the voters in I2.
The score garnered by k is
vk(x) = s1`(I2) + s3`(I1).
No “sharing” of votes occurs here, since no voters are indifferent between k and
another candidate.
Note that x is not an NCNE since profitable deviations are possible. Candidate
k, for example, can move inwards towards the other two candidates to gain a
larger score.
Often we will consider what happens to a candidate’s score on making in-
cremental deviations from her current position, or deviations to points infinites-
imally close to other occupied positions. For example, given an initial profile
x = (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xm), if we write that x
′ is the profile where candidate i moves
to xi + , what we mean is that x
′ = (x1, . . . , xi + , . . . , xm), where  > 0 is taken
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to be small enough that there are no occupied positions between xi and xi + ;
moreover, when  is small enough, for all j, k ∈ [q] we have |xi − xj | > |xi − xk|
if and only if |xi + − xj | > |xi + − xk|. This means that after this move only
candidates previously at the same location as xi change their positions in the
voters’ rankings. As  tends to zero, the measure of voters between xi and xi + 
tends to zero.
Given a scoring rule s = (s1, . . . , sm), sometimes we will consider subrules of
s. A subrule of s is a vector s′ = (si, si+1, . . . , si+j) where i, j ≥ 1 and i+ j ≤ m.
Thus, if si > si+j , a subrule is itself a scoring rule corresponding to an election
with j + 1 candidates. If si = · · · = si+j , then s′ does not define a scoring rule
and we say s′ is a constant subrule of s. An important parameter of the rule will
be the average score denoted s¯ = 1m
∑m
i=1 si.
Our equilibrium concept is the standard Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
To define it we introduce the following standard notation. Let x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗m)
be a strategy profile. Then by (xi, x
∗
−i) = (x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
i−1, xi, x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
m) we mean
the profile where the ith candidate adopts position xi instead of x
∗
i , whereas all
other candidates do not change their strategies.
Definition 2.2. A strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗m) is in Nash equilibrium if
for all i ∈ [m] we have
vi(x
∗) ≥ vi(xi, x∗−i),
for all xi ∈ [0, 1]. A Nash equilibrium (NE) x is said to be a convergent Nash
equilibrium (CNE) if all candidates adopt the same position, i.e., x = ((x1,m)).
If, in a Nash equilibrium, at least two candidates adopt distinct positions, we say
it is a nonconvergent Nash equilibrium (NCNE).
Definition 2.3. If a strategy profile
x = ((x1, n1), . . . , (x
q, nq))
is an NE, then we will say that (n1, . . . , nq) is its type. For example, the type of
a CNE is (m).
Before we begin presenting our results, we restate Cox [5] characterisation of
CNE for arbitrary scoring rules.
Theorem 2.4 (Cox [5]). Given a scoring rule s, the profile x = ((x1,m)) is a
CNE if and only if
c(s,m) ≤ x1 ≤ 1− c(s,m),
where c(s,m) =
s1 − s¯
s1 − sm .
For the inequality in Theorem 2.4 to be satisfied for some x1, it must be
that c(s,m) ≤ 1/2. The number c(s,m) encodes important information about
the competing incentives characteristic of a given scoring rule: in particular,
it measures the first-to-average drop in the value of the points relative to the
first-to-last drop. Motivated by the above theorem, Cox defined a best-rewarding
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rule5 to be a rule with c(s,m) > 1/2. Here, the incentive for candidates to
receive first place in a voter’s ranking outweighs the incentive to receive only an
average one. On the other hand, if c(s,m) < 1/2 the rule is said to be worst-
punishing. For such rules, receiving a first-place ranking is not all that better
than an average ranking—the main thing is to avoid being ranked last. Rules
satisfying c(s,m) = 1/2 are called intermediate. Hence, Cox’s result says that a
rule has CNE if and only if it is worst-punishing or intermediate, and the possible
equilibrium positions are in some interval of sufficiently centrist points.
The parameter c(s,m) attains its maximum value of c(s,m) = 1 − 1/m for
plurality rule, given by s = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Its minimum value of c(s,m) = 1/m, on
the other hand, occurs for the antiplurality (veto) rule, given by s = (1, . . . , 1, 0).
It is closely related to Myerson’s [17] “Cox threshold”, which in our notation is
s¯.
In addition, Cox also observed that in any NCNE the most extreme positions,
x1 and xq, must be occupied by at least two candidates and, hence, in the case
of a three-candidate election, no NCNE exist.
3 Preliminaries
Suppose in a profile x there are m candidates 1, 2, . . . ,m in positions x1, . . . , xm
occupying locations x1, . . . , xq and suppose candidate i is not alone at the location
she occupies. We will now investigate how the score of candidate i changes when
i changes position from xi to t ∈ [0, 1] while the positions of all candidates except
i are fixed. That is we are interested in the function vi(t, x−i).
Proposition 3.1. In the intervals (0, x1) and (xq, 1) the function vi(t, x−i) is
linear with slopes (s1 − sm)/2 and −(s1 − sm)/2, respectively.
Proof. Let t ∈ [0, x1). Let us split the issue space into intervals
I1 =
[
0,
t+ x1
2
)
, . . . , Ik =
[
t+ xk−1
2
,
t+ xk
2
)
, . . . , Iq+1 =
[
t+ xq
2
, 1
]
.
The voters in Ik rank candidate i in the same position on their ballots. For
1 6= k 6= q + 1 the length of Ik does not depend on t (and hence the contribution
to i’s score from voters in Ik). So when t changes, only the contributions to i’s
score from the voters in the two end intervals change. The sum of these is
s1
(
t+ x1
2
)
+ sm
(
1− t+ x
q
2
)
,
so the result follows. The second statement follows from the first due to an
obvious symmetry.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that apart from i there are j candidates in positions
x1, . . . , xl−1 and k candidates in positions xl, . . . , xq, where j + k = m− 1. Then
in the interval (xl−1, xl) the function vi(t, x−i) is linear with slope (sj+1−sk+1)/2.
5Terminology of R. Myerson [17].
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Proof. Suppose candidate i is currently at t. Let us split the issue space into
intervals [0, t] and [t, 1] (so that candidate i belongs to both of them) and ap-
ply the previous proposition to rules (s1, . . . , sj+1) and (s1, . . . , sk+1). Then the
nonconstant contributions to the score vi(t, x−i) from both intervals will be[
s1
(
xl − t
2
)
+ sk+1
(
1− t+ x
q
2
)]
+
[
s1
(
t− xl−1
2
)
+ sj+1
(
t+ x1
2
)]
=
(sj+1 − sk+1)
2
t+ const.,
which proves the proposition.
We also note that at points x1, . . . , xq the function vi(t, x−i) is in general
discontinuous and all three values
vi(x
j−, x−i) = lim
t→xj−
v(t, x−i), vi(xj , x−i), vi(xj+, x−i) = lim
t→xj+
v(t, x−i),
where the first and the third are one-sided limits, may be different.
We will now derive some general properties of NCNE which will come in useful
later. The following lemma places a lower bound on the number of candidates that
may occupy an extreme left or an extreme right position. This is a generalisation
of Cox’s [5, p. 93] observation that there can be no less than two candidates at
extreme positions.
Lemma 3.3. Given a scoring rule s, let 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1 be such that s1 =
· · · = sk > sk+1. Then a necessary condition for a profile x to be in NCNE is
min(n1, nq) > k.
Proof. Suppose n1 ≤ k and candidate 1 is located at x1. Let us split the issue
space into intervals
I1 =
[
0,
x1 + x2
2
)
, . . . , Ij =
[
x1 + xj
2
,
x1 + xj+1
2
)
, . . . , Iq =
[
x1 + xq
2
, 1
]
.
At x the contribution to candidate 1’s score v1(x) from the interval I1 = [0, (x
1+
x2)/2] is (
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si
)
`(I1) = s1`(I1),
and the contribution from the interval Ij is 1
n1
kj+n1−1∑
i=kj
si
 `(Jj),
for some kj , since candidate 1 is tied in the rankings of all voters in Ij . If 1
moves infinitesimally to the right, then these contributions to v1(x
1+, x−1) be-
come s1`(I1) and skj`(Ij), respectively. Indeed, 1 is still ranked at worst kth
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by voters in I1 and hence loses nothing. Also, 1 rises in all other voters’ rank-
ings. If skj > skj+n1−1 for at least one j, this move is strictly beneficial. This
infinitesimal “move” is not a real move. However, if it is strictly beneficial, then
by Proposition 3.2 we may conclude that a sufficiently small move to the right
will also be beneficial. If skj = skj+n1−1 for all j, then we consider the move by
candidate 1 to the right, to a position t ∈ (x1, x2). The intervals where voters
rank candidate 1 similarly will then be
I ′1 =
[
0,
t+ x2
2
)
, . . . , I ′j =
[
t+ xj
2
,
t+ xj+1
2
)
, . . . , I ′q =
[
t+ xq
2
, 1
]
.
We see that candidate 1 has increased the length of the first interval, from which
she receives s1, at the expense of the far-right interval, from which she receives
sm−n1+1 = sm < s1, while keeping the lengths of all other intervals unchanged.
So this move is beneficial.
So for NCNE we must have n1 > k. Similarly, nq > k.
This already allows us to make the following observation which rules out NCNE
for a class of scoring rules.
Corollary 3.4. If s is a scoring rule such that s1 = · · · = sk > sk+1 for some
k ≥ bm/2c, then s allows no NCNE.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, min(n1, nq) > k ≥ bm/2c. Hence, n1 + nq > m, a contra-
diction.
The rules specified in Corollary 3.4 are usually worst-punishing. However,
there are some that are slightly best-rewarding, as in the following example.
This shows that there exist best-rewarding rules which, unlike plurality, do not
allow NCNE. By Theorem 2.4, they have no CNE either, thus they have no Nash
equilibria whatsoever.
Example 3.5. If m is odd, consider k-approval with k = (m − 1)/2. That is,
s = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0), where the first k positions are ones. Then
c(s,m) = 1− 1
m
(
m− 1
2
)
=
1
2
+
1
2m
>
1
2
.
So the rule is best-rewarding but by Corollary 3.4 it has no NCNE. Note that
starting with this rule we can produce a family of best-rewarding rules that have
no NCNE. Clearly, the scores sk+1, . . . , sm could have been, instead of zeros,
arbitrary scores with the property that
1
m
m∑
i=k+1
si <
1
2m
and the rule would still have been best-rewarding, but without NCNE.
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The following lemma says that in an NCNE no candidates may occupy the
most extreme positions on the issue space, namely 0 or 1. This will allow us to
always assume that it is possible for a candidate to make a move into the end
intervals [0, x1) and (xq, 1].
Lemma 3.6. Let s be a scoring rule. In an NCNE x no candidate may adopt
the most extreme positions. That is, 0 < x1 and xq < 1.
Proof. Suppose x1 = 0. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1 be such that s1 = · · · = sk > sk+1.
Then by Lemma 3.3 we have n1 > k. Candidate 1’s score is
v1(x) =
(
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si
)
x2
2
+ S,
where S is the contribution to v1(x) from voters in the interval I = [x
2/2, 1].
Now suppose candidate 1 moves infinitesimally to the right. Then, in the limit,
1’s score is
v1(x
1+, x−1) = s1
x2
2
+ S′,
where S′ is the new contribution to 1’s score from the interval I. Since 1 has
moved up in the ranking of all the voters in I, S′ ≥ S. Also, since s1 = sk > sn1
we have
v1(x
1+, x−1) = s1
x2
2
+ S′ >
(
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si
)
x2
2
+ S′ ≥
(
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si
)
x2
2
+ S = v1(x).
By Proposition 3.2, v1(x
1+, x−1) > v1(x). Hence, candidate 1 benefits from
moving to the right, and hence x is not in NCNE. Thus, x1 > 0. Similarly,
xq < 1.
The next lemma places an upper bound on the length of the interval between
two occupied positions, or between the boundary of the issue space and the
nearest occupied position. From this, we will be able to derive a lower bound on
the number of occupied positions for a given scoring rule.
Lemma 3.7. Given a scoring rule s, if x is in NCNE, then both of the following
conditions must be satisfied:
(a) x1 ≤ 1− c(s,m) and 1− xq ≤ 1− c(s,m);
(b) xi − xi−1 ≤ 2(1− c(s,m)) for any i such that 2 ≤ i ≤ q.
Proof. Since sm < s¯ < s1, there exists a real number α with the property that
0 < α < 1 and αs1 + (1− α)sm = s¯. Rearranging this equation, one verifies that
α = 1− c(s,m).
At any profile x, there will be at least one candidate j who garners a total
score vj(x) ≤ s¯. Hence, if I is an end interval, namely [0, x1] or [xq, 1], then
we must have `(I) ≤ α. To show this we assume without loss of generality that
`(I) > α for I = [0, x1] and we show that candidate j would be able to make a
10
profitable move to x1 −  for some very small . By Proposition 3.1, this would
be proved if we could show that
vj(x
1−, x−j) > vj(x).
The idea is that by locating incrementally to the left from x1 candidate j captures
s1 from all the voters in I and at the very worst sm from all other voters. So
vj(x
1−, x−j) ≥ s1`(I) + sm(1− `(I)) > αs1 + (1− α)sm = s¯ ≥ vj(x).
Similarly, suppose xi − xi−1 > 2α for some 2 ≤ i ≤ q. Note that we can
assume candidate j is not an unpaired candidate located at xi or xi−1, since then
j already receives a score greater than αs1 + (1 − α)sm, which contradicts that
j’s score is no more than s¯. Hence, we may assume that position xi and xi−1
remains occupied when j moves. Now, if j moves to any point t in the interval
I = (xi−1, xi), we have
vj(t, x−j) ≥ s1
(
xi − xi−1
2
)
+ sm
(
1− x
i − xi−1
2
)
> αs1 + (1− α)sm ≥ vj(x).
Hence, for x to be in NCNE it must be that xi − xi−1 ≤ 2α.
Condition (a) of the previous lemma generalises Cox’s [5, p. 88] argument that
in a plurality election the most extreme candidates on either side are located
outside the interval (1/m, 1− 1/m).
Corollary 3.8. In an NCNE under a scoring rule s with c(s,m) > 1/2, the
most extreme candidates on either side are located outside the interval (1 −
c(s,m), c(s,m)).
Proof. This is simply condition (a) of Lemma 3.7. We need c(s,m) > 1/2 for the
result to be meaningful.
Note that the interval (1 − c(s,m), c(s,m)) reaches its maximal width under
plurality rule.
Corollary 3.9. Given a scoring rule s, in a Nash equilibrium the number of
occupied positions q satisfies
q ≥
⌈ 1
2(1− c(s,m))
⌉
.
Proof. If c(s,m) ≤ 1/2 it is clearly true as the right-hand side is equal to 1. If
c(s,m) > 1/2, only NCNE can exist with q ≥ 2 occupied positions. Then the
issue space can be partitioned into two end intervals, [0, x1) and [xq, 1], together
with q− 1 intervals of the form [xi−1, xi) for 2 ≤ i ≤ q. So, using Lemma 3.7, we
see that
1 = x1 + (1− xq) +
q∑
i=2
(xi − xi−1) ≤ 2q(1− c(s,m)),
whence the result. We round up since q is an integer.
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Thus, the amount of dispersion observed is increasing in c(s,m). When c(s,m)
increases above 3/4, the number of occupied positions required for NCNE in-
creases to at least three. When c(s,m) exceeds 5/6, the number of occupied
positions must be at least four. The maximum value of c(s,m) = 1 − 1/m is
attained for plurality, so there must be at least m/2 occupied positions. We will
return to consider these bounds in Section 4.3 where, with the help of a few more
lemmas, we will find that for most rules that are sufficiently best-rewarding, there
are no NCNE at all.
Lemma 3.10. Suppose at profile x candidate i is at xl and nl = 2. Then
vi(x
l−, x−i)+vi(xl+, x−i) = 2vi(x). In particular, when x is in NCNE, vi(xl−, x−i) =
vi(x
l+, x−i) = vi(x).
Proof. Again, the issue space can be divided into subintervals of voters who all
rank i in the same position. The immediate interval around xl is Il = I
L
l ∪ IRl ,
where: ILl = [(x
l−1 + xl)/2, xl] if l > 1 or ILl = [0, x
1] if l = 1; and, IRl =
[xl, (xl + xl+1)/2] if l < q or IRl = [x
l, 1] if l = q. The contribution to vi(x) from
the interval Il is
s1 + s2
2
(`(ILl ) + `(I
R
l )).
The contribution to vi(x
l−, x−i) from this interval is then s1`(ILl ) + s2`(I
R
l ) and
the contribution to vi(x
l+, x−i) is s2`(ILl ) + s1`(I
R
l ).
The contribution to vi(x) from any interval J to the left of Il, consisting of
voters who all rank i similarly, is
st + st+1
2
`(J)
for some 2 ≤ t ≤ m − 1. The contribution to vi(xl−, x−i) is st`(J) since when
candidate i moves infinitesimally to the left she rises one place in the rankings of
these voters. The contribution to vi(x
l+, x−i) is st+1`(J), since this move causes
i to fall one place in these voters’ rankings.
In the same way, the contribution to vi(x) from any interval J
′ to the right of
Il, consisting of voters who all rank i identically, is
st + st+1
2
`(J ′)
for some 2 ≤ t ≤ m− 1 while the contribution to vi(xl−, x−i) is st+1`(J ′) and the
contribution to vi(x
l+, x−i) is st`(J ′).
Hence, vi(x
l−, x−i) + vi(xl+, x−i) = 2vi(x) since for any subinterval Il, J or
J ′ the sum of the contributions to vi(xl−, x−i) and vi(xl+, x−i) is twice the con-
tribution to vi(x) from the same subinterval. For x to be in NCNE we need
both vi(x
l−, x−i) ≤ vi(x) and vi(xl+, x−i) ≤ vi(x). This is only possible when
vi(x
l−, x−i) = vi(xl+, x−i) = vi(x).
Lemma 3.11. If n1 = 2 or nq = 2 then a necessary condition for NCNE is
s2 = sm−1.
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Proof. Let n1 = 2. By Lemma 3.10 we have v1(x
1+, x−1) = v1(x). Hence, if 1
moves to a position t ∈ (x1, x2) then for NCNE we need v1(t, x−1) ≤ v1(x) =
v1(x
1+, x−1). Hence, the slope of the linear function v1(t, x−1) is nonpositive.
By Proposition 3.2 we then have s2 − sm−1 ≤ 0, which can happen only if s2 =
sm−1.
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 allow us to conclude that unpaired candidates are
actually quite rare. In particular, if m is even and sm/2 6= sm/2+1, there can be
none whatsoever. If m is odd and s(m−1)/2 6= s(m+3)/2 then the only candidate
that could possibly be unpaired is the median candidate. Lemmas 3.10 and 3.11
tell us the only rules that allow paired candidates at the end positions are the
rules of the form s = (s1, s2, . . . , s2, sm).
The consequences for elections with small number of candidates are as follows:
if m = 4, since the only possible profile for NCNE is the one with two distinct
positions occupied by two candidates apiece, we must have s2 = s3; for m = 5,
all possible partitions of the candidates (2-1-2 and 3-2) involve end positions
occupied by exactly two candidates, hence, for NCNE we need s2 = s3 = s4.
For m = 6, too, we can conclude that the partitions 2-1-1-2, 2-2-2 and 2-4 are
possibilities only for rules satisfying s2 = s3 = s4 = s5 (such as plurality, for
which the first two of these three partitions allow NCNE, see [11] or [8]). This
leaves only the partition 3-3 as a possible NCNE for rules which are not of this
kind. We will elaborate on these results in section 6.
4 Rules with almost no NCNE
In this section we will identify three quite broad classes of scoring rules for which
NCNE do not exist or do not exist with a few well-defined exceptions.
The first class is all scoring rules with convex scores. These are best-rewarding
rules and hence do not allow CNE. We show that such rules do not have NCNE
(in fact, they have no NE whatsoever) with the exception of some derivatives of
Borda rule. The second class consists of rules that satisfy a certain condition on
the speed with which the scores are decreasing; we call such rules weakly concave.
Rules that have concave scores or symmetric scores (we will explain what this
means later) belong to this class. These, in contrast, are are worst-punishing or
intermediate, hence, allow CNE by Theorem 2.4. We show that weakly concave
rules with a mild additional condition do not have NCNE. We show that if a
weakly concave rule has an NCNE, then it is highly nonsymmetric. We give an
example of such NCNE. We do not know, however, whether or not rules with
concave scores may have NCNE. We leave this question open. The third class
consists of rules that are highly best-rewarding.
4.1 Convex scores
We say that the rule s = (s1, . . . , sm) is convex if
s1 − s2 ≥ s2 − s3 ≥ . . . ≥ sm−1 − sm. (1)
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We note that as soon as si = si+1 for some i, all the subsequent scores must
also be equal for convexity to be satisfied. We aim to show that such rules,
with one class of possible exceptions, have no NCNE; moreover they have no
Nash equilibria at all. Firstly we show that a convex scoring rule s is either
best-rewarding or intermediate. In fact, we show a bit more.
Proposition 4.1. Let s be a scoring rule. Then s is convex if and only if every
nonconstant m′-candidate subrule s′, where 2 ≤ m′ ≤ m, has c(s′,m′) ≥ 1/2.
Proof. Suppose s satisfies (1). It suffices to show the rule itself is best-rewarding
or intermediate, since any nonconstant subrule also satisfies (1). We have, for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ bm/2c,
si − si+1 ≥ si+1 − si+2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm−i − sm−i+1.
In particular, all we need is
si − si+1 ≥ sm−i − sm−i+1. (2)
Suppose m is even. Equation (2) implies
s1 + sm ≥ s2 + sm−1 ≥ · · · ≥ sm/2 + sm/2+1.
Then
s¯ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
si =
(s1 + sm) + (s2 + sm−1) + · · ·+ (sm/2 + sm/2+1)
m
≤ m/2
m
(s1 + sm) =
1
2
(s1 + sm).
Suppose m is odd. Then (2) implies
s1 + sm ≥ s2 + sm−1 ≥ · · · ≥ s(m−1)/2 + s(m−1)/2+2 ≥ 2s(m+1)/2.
Then, letting k = (m− 1)/2, we have
s¯ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
si =
s1 + · · ·+ sk + sk+1 + · · ·+ sm
m
=
(s1 + sm) + · · ·+ (sk + sk+2) + sk+1
m
≤ k(s1 + sm) + sk+1
m
≤
(
1− 1
2m
)
(s1 + sm) +
1
2m
(s1 + sm) =
1
2
(s1 + sm).
So in both cases s1 + sm ≥ 2s¯, which is equivalent to c(s,m) ≥ 1/2.
Conversely, suppose every nonconstant subrule s′ is best-rewarding or inter-
mediate. Then any 3-candidate subrule s′ = (si, si+1, si+2) has c(s′, 3) ≥ 1/2,
which is equivalent to si − si+1 ≥ si+1 − si+2, so (1) is satisfied.
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Proposition 4.2. Let s be a convex scoring rule. Then both of the following
conditions:
(a) all inequalities in (1) are equalities,
(b) s satisfies s1 + sm =
2
m
∑m
i=1 si,
are equivalent to s being a Borda rule.6
Proof. (a) Let d be the common value of all the differences in (1). Then si =
(m− i)d+ sm. Subtracting sm from all scores does not change the rule. Dividing
all the scores by d after that does not change it either. But then we will get the
canonical Borda score vector with si = m− i.
(b) The condition (1) implies
s1 + sm ≥ s2 + sm−1 ≥ s3 + sm−2 ≥ . . . (3)
from which s1 + sm ≥ 2m
∑m
i=1 si. An equality here is possible only if we had all
equalities in (3) and this is possible only if we had equalities in (1). Now the
result follows from (a).
Now we can prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.3. Let s be a scoring rule with convex scores and let 1 ≤ n < m be
such that sn > sn+1 = · · · = sm. Then there are no NCNE, unless the subrule
s′ = (s1, · · · , sn, sn+1) is Borda and n+1 ≤ bm/2c (i.e., more than half the scores
are constant).
Proof. Let x be a profile. Consider candidate 1 at x1. Without loss of generality,
assume n1 ≤ bm/2c, since at least one of the two end positions has less than half
the candidates. Let I1 = [0, x
1] and I2 = [x
1, (x1 + x2)/2]. The rest of the issue
space to the right of (x1 + x2)/2 can be partitioned into subintervals
J1 =
[
x1 + x2
2
,
x1 + x3
2
)
, . . . , Jj =
[
x1 + xj+1
2
,
x1 + xj+2
2
)
, . . . , Jq−1 =
[
x1 + xq
2
, 1
]
,
where voters in each of these intervals rank candidate 1 in the same way. More
specifically, candidate 1 shares ki-th through to (ki + n1 − 1)-th place in the
rankings of all voters in Ji, for some ki ≥ 1 such that ki + n1 − 1 ≤ m. Then 1’s
score is
v1(x) =
(
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si
)
(`(I1) + `(I2)) +
q−1∑
j=1
 1
n1
kj+n1−1∑
i=kj
si
 `(Jj).
If candidate 1 moves infinitesimally to the left, then
v1(x
1−, x−1) = s1`(I1) + sn1`(I2) +
q−1∑
j=1
skj+n1−1`(Jj).
6Borda rule was defined in the introduction.
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Similarly, if she moves infinitesimally to the right, then
v1(x
1+, x−1) = s1`(I2) + sn1`(I1) +
q−1∑
j=1
skj`(Jj).
Let x be in NCNE. Then v1(x
1−, x−1) ≤ v1(x) and v1(x1+, x−1) ≤ v1(x). This
implies that v1(x
1−, x−1) + v1(x1+, x−1) ≤ 2v1(x). That is,
(s1 + sn1)(`(I1) + `(I2)) +
q−1∑
j=1
(skj + skj+n1−1)`(Jj)
≤
(
2
n1
n1∑
i=1
si
)
(`(I1) + `(I2)) + 2
q−1∑
j=1
 1
n1
kj+n1−1∑
i=kj
si
 `(Jj),
which implies(
s1 + sn1 −
2
n1
n1∑
i=1
si
)
(`(I1) + `(I2))
+
q−1∑
j=1
skj + skj+n1−1 − 2n1
kj+n1−1∑
i=kj
si
 `(Jj) ≤ 0. (4)
We know that the convexity of the scores implies sl + sl+n1−1 ≥ 2n1
∑l+n1−1
i=l si
for all l ≥ 1 such that l + n1 − 1 ≤ m. Thus, each term on the left-hand side
of (4) is nonnegative. If one or more of these terms is positive, then we have
a contradiction and hence no NCNE exist. The only other possibility is that
all these terms are equal to zero, which by Proposition 4.2 implies each of the
n1-candidate subrules appearing in the expression is equal to Borda or is constant
(in particular, the rule s′ = (s1, . . . , sn1) must be Borda, since s1 > sn1 by Lemma
3.3). In particular we get n1 ≤ n+ 1.
If this is the case then v1(x
1−, x−1) + v1(x1+, x−1) = 2v1(x), so for x to be in
NCNE we must have v1(x
1−, x−1) = v1(x1+, x−1) = v1(x). Then, for x to be in
NCNE we must have v1(t, x−1) ≤ v1(x) = v1(x1+, x−1) for any t ∈ (x1, x2), that
is, the score cannot increase as 1 moves to the right from x1. By Proposition 3.2,
the slope of the linear function v1(t, x−1) for t ∈ (x1, x2) is 12sn1 − 12sm−n1+1
and since it is nonincreasing we have 12sn1 − 12sm−n1+1 ≤ 0. On the other hand,
1
2sn1 − 12sm−n1+1 ≥ 0 since n1 < m − n1 + 1. We conclude therefore that sn1 =
sm−n1+1. This means that the scores have stabilised on or earlier than sn1 ,
whence n1 ≥ n+ 1. As n1 ≤ n+ 1, we must now conclude that n1 = n+ 1.
Hence, there are no NCNE unless the subrule s′ = (s1, . . . , sn, sn+1) is Borda
and n+ 1 ≤ bm/2c.
For the special case where s has convex scores, the subrule s′ = (s1, . . . , sn+1)
is Borda and the scores from sn+1 through sm are constant, Theorem 4.3 says
nothing and for good reason since here NCNE can actually exist. This will follow
from Theorem 5.5 and Example 5.8.
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Rules satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.3 include Borda (for which nonex-
istence of NCNE also follows from Theorem 4.7) as well as the following examples.
Example 4.4. The following rules have convex scores and, hence, no NCNE.
(i) Given s1, define a scoring rule by si = s1/α
i−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ m, where α > 1.
That is, multiply the previous score by the same factor 1/α each time.
(ii) Given sm, define a rule by sm−i = sm−i+1 + αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, where
α > 0. That is, add an increasing amount each time.
(iii) The rule s = (1, s2, 0, . . . , 0), for any 0 < s2 < 1/2. The significance of
this is that even a slight deviation from plurality destroys the NCNE which
plurality is known to possess.
4.2 Concave scores
We say that the rule s = (s1, . . . , sm) is concave if
s1 − s2 ≤ s2 − s3 ≤ . . . ≤ sm−1 − sm. (5)
Most our positive results are, however, applicable to a larger class of rules
which we call weakly concave. We say that a scoring rule is weakly concave if it
obeys the following property:
si − si+1 ≤ sm−i − sm−i+1, (6)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ bm/2c. That is, the difference between consecutive scores at the
top end must not be larger than the corresponding difference at the bottom end.
If we always have an equality in (6) we say that the rule is symmetric.
Proposition 4.5. A weakly concave rule is either worst-punishing or intermedi-
ate. That is, c(s,m) ≤ 1/2.
Proof. Note that (6) is condition (2) with the inequalities reversed. Hence, re-
versing all the inequalities in Proposition 4.1, we obtain c(s,m) ≤ 1/2.
Before we can prove the main result of this section, we will need one more
lemma.
Lemma 4.6. If s is a weakly concave rule, then
sj + sm−j+1 ≥ 1
j
 j∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−j+1
si
 (7)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ bm/2c. Moreover, if s satisfies
sk + sm−k+1 ≥ 1
k
(
k∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−k+1
si
)
(8)
for some k > bm/2c, then inequality (7) holds for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
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Proof. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ bm/2c. Equation (6) implies that
s1 + sm ≤ s2 + sm−1 ≤ · · · ≤ sj + sm−j+1,
whence
j∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−j+1
si =
j∑
i=1
(si + sm−i+1) ≤ j(sj + sm−j+1),
which, on dividing by j, gives (7). This proves the first part of the lemma.
Now suppose that (8) holds for some k > bm/2c. The statement will be
proved by induction if we can prove that (7) holds for j = k − 1. If j = bm/2c
the statement follows from the first part of the lemma. So assume k > bm/2c+1.
We have(
k∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−k+1
si
)
−
(
k−1∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−k+2
si
)
= sk + sm−k+1 ≥ 1
k
(
k∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−k+1
si
)
.
This rearranges to give
1
k
(
k∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−k+1
si
)
≥ 1
k − 1
(
k−1∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−k+2
si
)
.
Since k > bm/2c+ 1, we have m− k + 1 ≤ bm/2c and hence by (6) we conclude
sm−k+1 + sk ≤ sm−k+2 + sk−1. Putting things together, we get
sm−k+2 + sk−1 ≥ 1
k − 1
(
k−1∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−k+2
si
)
.
Thus, equation (8) holds for j = k − 1, which proves the induction step.
Next, we show a weakly concave rule has no NCNE in which each of the
end positions is occupied by less than half the candidates. If (8) also holds for
k = m− 3, which is condition (9) below, then we can rule out NCNE altogether.
Theorem 4.7. Any weakly concave scoring rule s has no NCNE in which max(n1, nq) ≤
bm/2c. If, in addition, s satisfies
s4 + sm−3 ≥ 1
m− 3
(
m−3∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=4
si
)
, (9)
then no NCNE exist.
Proof. Suppose max(n1, nq) ≤ bm/2c. Consider candidate 1 at position x1, which
is occupied by n1 candidates. Consider intervals I1 = [0, x
1] and I2 = [(x
1 +
xq)/2, 1]. If 1 makes an infinitesimal move to the right of x1, then in the rankings
of voters in I1 she falls behind the other n1 − 1 candidates originally at x1. On
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the other hand, 1 rises ahead of these n1 − 1 candidates in the rankings of all
other voters. Then the score candidate 1 loses by making this move, slost, is
slost =
(
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si − sn1
)
`(I1).
On the other hand, 1’s gain from this move, sgained, is at least the gain from I2:
sgained ≥
(
sm−n1+1 −
1
n1
m∑
i=m−n1+1
si
)
`(I2) ≥
(
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si − sn1
)
`(I2), (10)
where we have used (7). For this profile to be an NCNE, we need this move not
be beneficial for candidate 1. That is, we need slost ≥ sgained, or(
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si − sn1
)
`(I1) ≥
(
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si − sn1
)
`(I2).
Since by Lemma 3.3 we know that s1 > sn1 , and hence the common multiple on
both sides of the inequality is nonzero, this implies
`(I1) ≥ `(I2) or x1 ≥ 1− x
1 + xq
2
. (11)
Since nq is also assumed to be not greater than bm/2c, similar considerations
with respect to candidate q give that `([xq, 1]) ≥ `([0, (x1 + xq)/2]). That is,
1− xq ≥ x
1 + xq
2
. (12)
Together, (11) and (12) imply that x1 ≥ xq, which is impossible for an NCNE.
Hence, there are no NCNE in which max(n1, nq) ≤ bm/2c.
Now, if (9) holds as well, then by (8) of Lemma 4.6 we conclude that
sm−n1+1 + sn1 ≥
1
n1
(
n1∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m−n1+1
si
)
(13)
for all 2 ≤ n1 ≤ m−3, which are all the possible values for n1, with the exception
of the case n1 = m−2. However, if n1 = m−2 then nq = 2, in which case Lemma
3.11 implies that s2 = sm−1. But for any rule of this form, (13) is satisfied for
n1 = m− 2, also.
Hence, inequalities (11) and (12) hold even if n1 > bm/2c, and similarly for
nq > bm/2c. So there can be no NCNE at all.
The following rules will appear important later.
Corollary 4.8. Any scoring rule s = (a, b, . . . , b, 0) for a ≤ 2b does not have an
NCNE.
Proof. These rules are weakly concave and condition (9) is satisfied.
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Let us now have a look at some more examples.
Example 4.9. When m = 8, it turns out that the additional condition (9) in
Theorem 4.7 follows from (6). Indeed, it is equivalent to
s4 + s5 ≥ 1
3
(s1 + s2 + s3 + s6 + s7 + s8).
But by (6) we have s1 + s8 ≤ s2 + s7 ≤ s3 + s6 ≤ s4 + s5, hence (9) always holds
if (6) holds.
By a similar argument, condition (9) is again redundant when m ≤ 8. If
m = 9, though, there are rules that satisfy (6) but not (9). Consider the rule
s = (7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 2, 1, 1, 0). We have s4 + s6 = 8 < 8
1
6 =
1
6(
∑6
i=1 si +
∑9
i=4 si). If
an NCNE exists for this rule, it must have more than four candidates at one of
the end positions. However, computationally we find this rule has no NCNE.
An interesting special case is rules with symmetric scores.
Corollary 4.10. Any symmetric scoring rule s has no NCNE.
Proof. Clearly (6) is satisfied. Condition (9) is also satisfied since for any valid
value of n1 we have
1
n1
m∑
i=m−n1+1
si +
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
si =
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
(si + sm−i+1) =
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
(sn1 + sm−n1+1)
= sn1 + sm−n1+1.
Some examples of rules with symmetric scores are single-positive and single-
negative voting, given by s = (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), and the rule s = (4, 3, 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0).
Finally, we will give an example showing that condition (9) in Theorem 4.7 is
necessary.
Example 4.11. For m = 12 the scoring rule s = (4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
satisfies weak concavity, yet does allow NCNE. In particular, the profile
((x1, n1), (x
2, n2)) =
((
13
28
, 8
)
,
(
41
84
, 4
))
with eight candidates at position x1 = 1328 and four at position x
2 = 4184 is an
NCNE.
Proof. It is clear this rule satisfies weak concavity. We check that it does not
satisfy the additional condition:
s4 + s9 = 4 <
38
9
=
1
9
(
9∑
i=1
si +
12∑
i=4
si
)
.
So we cannot rule out highly asymmetric equilibria.
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Now, we check the given profile is an NCNE. Consider first candidate 1, located
at x1. Her score in the given profile is
v1(x) =
1
8
[
24
(
x1 + x2
2
)
+ 10
(
1− x
1 + x2
2
)]
=
25
12
.
We must consider all possible moves by candidate 1. Moving slightly to the left
is not profitable since
v1(x
1−, x−1) = 4x1 +
(
x2 − x1
2
)
=
157
84
<
25
12
= v1(x).
All moves into the middle interval are dominated by the move to x1+, but this is
not profitable since
v1(x
1+, x−1) = 4
(
x2 − x1
2
)
+ x1 + 3
(
1− x
1 + x2
2
)
=
25
12
= v1(x).
A move to x2+ is not profitable as
v1(x
2+, x−1) = 4(1− x2) + 3
(
x2 − x1
2
)
=
25
12
= v1(x).
Finally, a move to x2 is not profitable either, since
v1(x
2, x−1) =
1
5
[
18
(
1− x
1 + x2
2
)
+ 2
(
x1 + x2
2
)]
=
218
105
< v1(x).
So candidates at x1 cannot improve their scores.
Now, check for candidate 9, at position x2. We have
v9(x) =
1
4
[
15
(
1− x
1 + x2
2
)
+
(
x1 + x2
2
)]
=
25
12
.
The move to x2+ gives
v9(x
2+, x−9) = 4(1− x2) + 3
(
x2 − x1
2
)
=
25
12
= v9(x).
All moves into the middle interval are dominated by the move to x1+, which is
not profitable since
v9(x
1+, x−9) = 4
(
x2 − x1
2
)
+ x1 + 3
(
1− x
1 + x2
2
)
=
25
12
= v9(x).
The move to x1− gives
v9(x
1−, x−9) = 4x1 +
(
x2 − x1
2
)
=
157
84
< v9(x).
Finally, the move to x1 gives
v9(x
1, x−9) =
1
9
[
25
(
x1 + x2
2
)
+ 13
(
1− x
1 + x2
2
)]
=
131
63
< v9(x).
There are no other moves to consider, so the given profile is an NCNE.
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Concavity is stronger than weak concavity, however it does not imply (9)
either. A counterexample is s = (4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) when m =
16. It has concave scores but does not satisfy (9). Of course, it has no NCNE by
Corollary 3.4.
This leads us to a question which we leave open in this paper: does there exist
a concave rule that has an NCNE?
A few words about a dichotomy between CNE and NCNE—when m = 4, a
given rule cannot have both NCNE and CNE.
Corollary 4.12. If m = 4 and s = (s1, s2, s3, s4) is a scoring rule such that
c(s,m) ≤ 1/2, then there are no NCNE.
Proof. Let m = 4 and suppose s = (s1, s2, s3, s4) is a worst-punishing rule. That
is,
c(s, 4) =
s1 − 14(s1 + s2 + s3 + s4)
s1 − s4 ≤
1
2
,
which is equivalent to s1 − s2 ≤ s3 − s4. That is, condition (6) is equivalent to
c(s,m) ≤ 1/2. Condition (9), as we commented in Example 4.9, is redundant
for m ≤ 8 (indeed, if m = 4, the only possible type of an NCNE is (2,2), so we
cannot have any asymmetry), so NCNE cannot exist.
For five candidates and more, however, c(s,m) ≤ 1/2 does not imply condition
(6)—there exist rules that are worst-punishing and do not satisfy (6). Neverthe-
less, as we will see later, in Theorem 6.3, the dichotomy for five candidates still
holds and no rule can have both CNE and NCNE. However this dichotomy need
not hold in general—indeed when there are six candidates it fails: this will be
illustrated in Example 5.12.
4.3 Highly best-rewarding rules
We will now show that for many rules, if the value of c(s,m) is high enough, then
no NCNE are possible.
Theorem 4.13. If m is even and s satisfies both
c(s,m) > 1− 1
m− 2 and sm/2 6= sm/2+1, (14)
or, if m is odd and s satisfies both
c(s,m) > 1− 1
m− 1 and s(m−1)/2 6= s(m+3)/2, (15)
then s allows no NCNE.
Proof. Suppose first that m is even and s satisfies (14). Rearranging, we get
1
2(1− c(s,m)) >
m
2
− 1.
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By Corollary 3.9, then, we have q ≥ d 12(1−c(s,m))e ≥ m/2. Also, since sm/2 6=
sm/2+1, we know by Proposition 3.2 that in an NCNE there are no unpaired
candidates, and hence there must be at least two candidates at each occupied
position. But there are at leastm/2 positions, hence there must be two candidates
at each one, including the end positions. But also s2 ≥ sm/2 6= sm/2+1 ≥ sm−1,
which violates Lemma 3.11. So we cannot have NCNE.
Now suppose m is odd. Similarly to the above we get
1
2(1− c(s,m)) >
m− 1
2
,
hence q ≥ (m+1)/2. There must be at least one position with only one candidate
and in fact there can be only one such position since, by Proposition 3.2, the only
candidate that can be unpaired is the median candidate. This leaves at least two
candidates at each of the q − 1 ≥ (m − 1)/2 other occupied positions. Again,
the only possibility is that there are two candidates at each of these remaining
positions, but this contradicts Lemma 3.11.
Let us look at a concrete examples of rules that satisfy Theorem 4.13. Clearly
all such rules are best-rewarding (recall that we assume m ≥ 4), hence these rules
allow no Nash equilibria of any kind.
Example 4.14. When m = 6, the rule is s = (s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, 0) and the condi-
tions of Theorem 4.13 are equivalent to s3 6= s4 and s1 > 2(s2 + s3 + s4 + s5).
The rules s = (5, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) and s = (7, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) are of this kind.
Note that the rules in the example above may have convex scores, so we see
that this class of rules overlaps with the class of rules appearing in Theorem 4.3.
Clearly neither class contains the other, though. If the second condition in (14)
or (15) is not satisfied, then there may be NCNE, even if the rule has a very high
value of c(s,m). Plurality, for example, has the maximal value of c(s,m) but still
possesses NCNE.
5 Rules allowing NCNE
In this section we will turn our attention to rules for which, unlike the rules
considered up to now, NCNE do exist. We first look at a class of rules s =
(a, b, . . . , b, 0) for which we find experimentally as many NCNE as for plurality
and with similar properties. Second, we look at the class of best-rewarding rules
for which we can find NCNE in which candidates cluster at positions spread across
the issue space. Then, we characterise symmetric bipositional NCNE when m is
even.
5.1 Rules of the type (a, b, . . . , b, 0)
We have seen in Corollary 4.8 that for a ≤ 2b this rule does not have NCNE. The
situation changes radically if we assume that a > 2b. This is not surprising due
to the following
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Proposition 5.1. The m-candidate rule s = (a, b, . . . , b, 0) is best rewarding if
and only if a > 2b and worst punishing or intermediate when a ≤ 2b.
Proof. We have
c(s,m) =
a− a+(m−2)bm
a
=
m− 1
m
− m− 2
m
· b
a
.
Then c(s,m) ≤ 12 is equivalent to (m−2) ≤ 2(m−2) ba , from which the statement
follows.
Computational experiments show that when a > 2b the rule s = (a, b, . . . , b, 0)
has multiple NCNE similar to those discovered for plurality by Eaton and Lipsey
[11] and Denzau et al. [8]. For example, the rule s = (3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) has
NCNE with q = 4, 5, 6 and (n1, . . . , nq) being one of the following:
(2, 2, 2, 2), (2, 2, 1, 1, 2), (2, 1, 2, 1, 2), (2, 1, 1, 2, 2), (2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2).
We notice that at any given position there are no more than two candidates.
Theorem 5.2. If s = (s1, . . . , sm) = (a, b, . . . , b, 0), then in any NCNE at any
given position there are no more than two candidates.
Proof. By Corollary 4.8 we have to consider only the case when a > 2b. This
case will be considered in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 5.3. If s = (s1, . . . , sm) = (a, b, . . . , b, 0), where a > 2b, then in NCNE
ni ≤ 2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1.
Proof. If ni > 2, where 2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, then candidate k, located at xi is not
ranked last by any voter. Moreover, she is not ranked last by any voter even
on deviating to xi+ or xi−. So the only change in her score on making these
moves is from voters in the immediate subintervals I1 = [(x
i−1 + xi)/2, xi] and
I2 = [x
i, (xi + xi+1)/2], where voters change candidate k from first equal to first,
and from first equal to nith, respectively. In NCNE we must have
vk(x
i−, x−k)− vk(x) = s1`(I1) + s2`(I2)−
 1
ni
ni∑
j=1
sj
 (`(I1) + `(I2)) ≤ 0.
Also
vk(x
i+, x−k)− vk(x) = s1`(I2) + s2`(I1)−
 1
ni
ni∑
j=1
sj
 (`(I1) + `(I2)) ≤ 0.
Adding together these two inequalities we get s1 + sni ≤ 2ni
∑ni
j=1 sj , but the
subrule s′ = (s1, . . . , sni) = (a, b, . . . , b) of length ni is best-rewarding whenever
ni > 2. That is, s1 + sni >
2
ni
∑ni
j=1 sj .
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Lemma 5.4. If s = (s1, . . . , sm) = (a, b, . . . , b, 0), where a > 2b, then in NCNE
n1 = nq = 2.
Proof. Let us introduce the following notation:
• α = x1 – the proportion of voters to the left of candidate 1.
• β = (x2 − x1)/2 – the proportion of voters in half the interval between
candidates 1 and 2.
• γ = 1 − (x1 + xq)/2 – the proportion of voters for whom 1 is ranked last
equal.
Note that
v1(x) =
s1
n1
(α+ β) + s2 − s2
n1
(α+ β + γ)) =
(s1 − s2)
n1
(α+ β) + s2
(
1− γ
n1
)
.
Consider if 1 moves to x1−. Then
v1(x
1−, x−1) = s1α+ s2(1− α− γ) = (s1 − s2)α+ s2(1− γ).
If 1 moves to x1+ then
v1(x
1+, x−1) = s1β + s2(1− β) = (s1 − s2)β + s2.
For NCNE we require that these moves not be beneficial to candidate 1. That
is, v1(x
1−, x−1) ≤ v1(x) which implies
(s1 − s2)α+ s2(1− γ) ≤ (s1 − s2)
n1
(α+ β) + s2
(
1− γ
n1
)
or
(s1 − s2)
(
1− 1
n1
)
α ≤ (s1 − s2)
n1
β + s2
(
1− 1
n1
)
γ. (16)
Similarly, for the other move we have v1(x
1+, x−1) ≤ v1(x) which gives us
(s1 − s2)
(
1− 1
n1
)
β ≤ (s1 − s2)
n1
α− s2 γ
n1
or
(s1 − s2)
[(
1− 1
n1
)
β − α
n1
]
≤ −s2 γ
n1
≤ 0. (17)
Then (17) implies that β(n1 − 1) ≤ α since we know that s1 > s2. In addition,
rearranging (17) gives
s2γ ≤ (s1 − s2)(α+ β − n1β)
and multiplying through by the positive number 1− 1/n1
s2
(
1− 1
n1
)
γ ≤
(
1− 1
n1
)
(s1 − s2)(α+ β − n1β). (18)
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Substituting (18) into (16) and dividing through by s1 − s2 > 0 we get(
1− 1
n1
)
α ≤ β
n1
+
(
1− 1
n1
)
(α+ β − n1β)
0 ≤ β(2− n1). (19)
Since β > 0, equation (19) requires that n1 ≤ 2. So n1 = 2. A similar argument
gives nq = 2.
5.2 Multipositional clustered NCNE
We introduce some additional notation. Let
(i) I1 = [0, (x
1 + x2)/2],
(ii) Ii = [(x
i−1 + xi)/2, (xi + xi+1)/2] for 2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1,
(iii) Iq = [(x
q−1 + xq)/2, 1],
be the “full-electorates” corresponding each occupied position. For each i ∈ [q]
let ILi = {y ∈ Ii : y ≤ xi} and IRi = {y ∈ Ii : y ≥ xi} be the left and right
“half-electorates” whose union is the full-electorate Ii, that is Ii = I
L
i ∪ IRi . We
note that `(IRi ) = `(I
L
i+1) for i ∈ [q − 1].
The following theorem provides a method of constructing rules for which mul-
tipositional NCNE exist.
Theorem 5.5. Let m = qr be a composite number with q ≥ 2. Consider an
m-candidate scoring rule s = (s1, . . . , sr−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
, · · · , 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
). Then the
profile given by x = ((x1, r), . . . , (xq, r)) is in NCNE if and only if the following
two conditions hold:
(a) maxi∈[q] max{`(ILi ), `(IRi )} ≤ (1− c(s′, r)) mini∈[q]{`(Ii)},
(b) maxi∈[q]{`(Ii)} ≤
(
1 + 1r
)
mini∈[q]{`(Ii)},
where s′ = (s1, . . . , sr−1, 0).
The idea is that for this kind of scoring rule, each occupied position is “iso-
lated” from the rest of the issue space, since a candidate at this position receives
nothing from voters who rank her rth or worse. So the candidates have to com-
pete “locally”. Note that condition (a) can only be satisfied if c(s′, r) ≤ 1/2,
since it implies
max
i∈[q]
max{`(ILi ), `(IRi )} ≤ (1− c(s′, r)) min
i∈[q]
{`(Ii)}
≤ 2(1− c(s′, r)) max
i∈[q]
max{`(ILi ), `(IRi )},
from which c(s′, r) ≤ 1/2 follows. That is, though the scoring rule is best-
rewarding, the subrule s′, for x to be in NCNE, must be worst-punishing or
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intermediate. Hence, comparing this with Theorem 2.4, we see that locally each
occupied position behaves with respect to the rule s′ in a similar way to a CNE
on the whole issue space.
Proof. Consider candidate i at position xk. Since all of i’s score is garnered from
the immediate full-electorate Ik, i’s score is
vi(x) =
1
r
r∑
j=1
sj
 `(Ik).
Suppose that i moves to some position t between two occupied positions or be-
tween an occupied position and the boundary of the issue space. In the latter
case, i is now ranked first by, at best, all voters in the intervals IL1 or I
R
q . In the
former case, when xl < t < xl+1 for some l, candidate i is ranked first by voters in
the interval [(xl + t)/2, (t+ xl+1)/2], which is equal in length to `(IRl ) = `(I
L
l+1).
From the rest of the issue space, i is ranked at best rth, so receives nothing. In
each case, i’s score is now
vi(t, x−i) = s1`(J),
for the half-electorate J that i moves into. For NCNE we need this move not be
beneficial, that is, vi(t, x−i) ≤ vi(x). Thus, for NCNE we must have
s1`(J) ≤
1
r
r∑
j=1
sj
 `(Ik),
which occurs if and only if
`(J) ≤ (1− c(s′, r))`(Ik).
This must hold when i moves into any of the half-electorates, and for any candi-
date at any initial position. This yields the necessity of condition (a).
Also, there is a possibility that i moves to some position xl that is already
occupied. In this case her score becomes
vi(x
l, x−i) =
 1
r + 1
r+1∑
j=1
sj
 `(Il) =
 1
r + 1
r∑
j=1
sj
 `(Il),
which again must not exceed vi(x). Hence, we must have 1
r + 1
r∑
j=1
sj
 `(Il) ≤
1
r
r∑
j=1
sj
 `(Ik)
or
`(Il) ≤
(
1 +
1
r
)
`(Ik).
Again, this must hold for any pair of full-electorates, which implies that condition
(b) is necessary.
There are no other possible moves, so (a) and (b) are sufficient for NCNE.
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We note that the degree to which the positions can be nonsymmetric depends
on how small c(s′, r) is. If c(s′, r) = 1/2, for example, then by condition (a)
of Theorem 5.5 we must have that all the electorates are the same size and the
occupied positions are at the halfway point of each one. If the profile is symmetric,
with the candidates positioned so as to divide the issue space into equally sized
full-electorates, Theorem 5.5 simplifies.
Corollary 5.6. Let there be m = qr candidates, q ≥ 2, and consider the scoring
rule s = (s1, . . . , sr−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
, · · · , 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
). Then the profile given by x =
((x1, r), . . . , (xq, r)) such that `(Ii) = 1/q for all i ∈ [q], is in NCNE if and only
if c(s′, r) ≤ 1/2, where s′ = (s1, . . . , sr−1, 0).
Proof. Since each Ii is the same length, condition (b) of Theorem 5.5 is satisfied.
Condition (a) reduces to 1/2q ≤ (1 − c(s′, r))/q, whence the requirement that
c(s′, r) ≤ 1/2.
Now let us look at some examples.
Example 5.7. Consider r-candidate k-approval rule s′ = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
) with
r ≥ k + 1. The condition c(s′, r) ≤ 1/2 holds if and only if r ≤ 2k, suppose this
is true. By appending zeros to the end of s′, we can extend s′ to k-approval with
m = qr candidates for any q ≥ 2. Then Theorem 5.5 implies there exist NCNE
in which r candidates position themselves at each of the q distinct locations.
As a special case, consider 1-approval, which is just plurality: s = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
For any even m, if we set r = 2 then we obtain s′ = (1, 0) with c(s′, 2) = 1/2. So
the profile where two candidates locate at each position so as to divide the space
into equally sized intervals is an NCNE, and it is the only one in which there are
two candidates at each position. We cannot have r > 2, as then we would have
c(s′, r) > 1/2. So plurality has no equilibria in which more than two candidates
locate at each position, in agreement with the well-known results of Eaton and
Lipsey [11] and Denzau et al. [8].
Example 5.8. Let s′ = (r − 1, r − 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0), that is, s′ is Borda. Let s,
of length m = qr, q ≥ 2, be the rule resulting from appending (q − 1)r zeros
to s′. Then c(s′, r) = 1/2, so there exists an NCNE in which r candidates
position themselves at the q halfway points of q equally sized full-electorates that
partition the issue space.
Recall that Theorem 4.3 stated that a rule with convex scores has no NCNE,
unless the nonconstant part of the scoring rule is exactly Borda and is shorter
than the constant part. The rule s in Example 5.8 is precisely such a rule. Hence,
the exception in Theorem 4.3 does indeed need to be made.
Example 5.9. For a given scoring rule, NCNE with different partitions of the
candidates can exist simultaneously. Consider 3-approval, s = (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0),
with m = 20. Then if r = 4 we have c((1, 1, 1, 0), 4) = 1/4 < 1/2, so there are
NCNE with five distinct positions occupied by four candidates apiece. At the
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same time, if r = 5 we have c((1, 1, 1, 0, 0), 5) = 2/5 < 1/2, so there are also
NCNE with four distinct positions occupied by five candidates apiece.
5.3 Symmetric bipositional NCNE
A CNE is the simplest kind of Nash equilibrium that may exist. We now turn
our attention to what would be the next simplest kind – an NCNE in which there
are only two occupied positions. Here we restrict ourselves to the case where m is
even and the equilibrium positions are symmetric. We saw in Example 4.11 that
bipositional equilibria are not necessary symmetric. At the end of this section we
will give an example of a nonsymmetric bipositional equilibria for m = 7. Later
it will become clear that this is the smallest value of m for which nonsymmetric
bipositional equilibria exist.
Theorem 5.10. Suppose m is even. Then the profile x = ((x1,m/2), (x2,m/2)),
with 0 < x1 < 1/2 and x2 = 1− x1, is in NCNE if and only if both
sm/2 + sm/2+1
2
< s¯ (20)
and
s1 + sm/2 − 2s¯
2(s1 − sm/2+1)
≤ x1 ≤ 2s¯− sm − sm/2
2(s1 − sm/2)
. (21)
If in addition c(s,m) ≤ 1/2, then the profile x is in NCNE whenever
s1 + sm/2 − 2s¯
2(s1 − sm/2+1)
≤ x1 < 1
2
. (22)
Moreover, (22) can always be satisfied.
Proof. By the symmetry of the positions, (x1 + x2)/2 = 1/2 and (x2 − x1)/2 =
1/2 − x1. At x, all candidates receive 1/m-th of the points, so vi(x) = s¯ for all
i = 1, . . . ,m. Note that it is necessary that s1 > sm/2, since otherwise there
would need to be more than m/2 candidates at each position by Lemma 3.3.
By symmetry, for NCNE it is enough to require candidate 1 not be able to
deviate profitably, and there are only three moves to consider: a move to x1 − ,
which is always better than a move to x2 + , since 1 is ranked one place higher
for half of voter in the middle interval; a move to x2 − , which is the best move
out of any into the middle interval since the slope of v1(t, x−1) in that interval is
nonnegative by Proposition 3.2; and, finally, a move to x2.
For the first one we have
v1(x
1−, x−1) = s1x1 + sm/2
(
1
2
− x1
)
+
1
2
sm.
For NCNE, it must be that v1(x
1−, x−1) ≤ v1(x), which yields the requirement
x1 ≤ 2s¯− sm − sm/2
2(s1 − sm/2)
. (23)
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For the second move we have
v1(x
2−, x−1) = s1
(
1
2
− x1
)
+
1
2
sm/2 + sm/2+1x
1.
The fact that v1(x
2−, x−1) ≤ v1(x) yields
x1 ≥ s1 + sm/2 − 2s¯
2(s1 − sm/2+1)
. (24)
Finally,
v1(x
2, x−1) =
1
m/2 + 1
m/2+1∑
i=1
si +
m∑
i=m/2
si
 1
2
=
1
m+ 2
(
ms¯+ sm/2 + sm/2+1
)
.
Since in an NCNE v1(x
2, x−1) ≤ v1(x), it must be that sm/2 + sm/2+1 ≤ 2s¯.
There are no other moves to consider, so if the position x1 is valid, that is,
satisfies (23), (24) and is in the range 0 < x1 < 1/2, then we have an NCNE. The
condition x1 < 1/2 combined with (24) implies the strict inequality in (20). The
condition x1 > 0 means that we need the right-hand side of (23) to be strictly
greater than zero, which is always true.
Finally, note that the requirement that s1 > sm/2 is implied by (20), since if
sm/2 = s1 then we have
sm/2 + sm/2+1 = s1 + sm/2+1 < 2s¯ = s1 +
2
m
m∑
i=m/2+1
si ≤ s1 + sm/2+1,
a contradiction.
To prove the second statement, suppose a scoring rule satisfies both c(s,m) ≤
1/2 and (20). Since c(s,m) ≤ 1/2 is equivalent to s1 + sm ≤ 2s¯, the right-hand
side of (21) always satisfies
1
2
≤ 2s¯− sm − sm/2
2(s1 − sm/2)
. (25)
Similarly, the left-hand side satisfies
s1 + sm/2 − 2s¯
2(s1 − sm/2+1)
<
1
2
. (26)
Putting together (25) and (26), we see that it will always be possible to find valid
values of x1 in the desired range.
Example 5.11. Again consider k-approval with k < m/2. Clearly, (20) is satis-
fied. Then we have symmetric bipositional NCNE whenever 1/2 − k/m ≤ x1 ≤
k/m, which is valid whenever k ≥ m/4. Thus, as k decreases and the rule be-
comes more best-rewarding, the more extreme positions are possible, until we
reach the point where a bipositional equilibrium is no longer viable. NCNE with
more than two positions then become possible, as can be seen by Theorem 5.5
and as one would expect by Corollary 3.9.
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Theorem 5.10 allows us to conclude that bipositional NCNE may exist for
both best-rewarding and worst-punishing rules, as we will see in the examples
below.
Example 5.12. Let m = 6. Consider the following rules:
(i) s = (2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 0). We have s3 + s4 = 2 < 7/3 =
2
6
∑6
i=1 si, so (20) is
satisfied. Equation (21) reduces to 1/3 ≤ x1 ≤ 2/3, so the profile x =
((x1, 3), (1−x1, 3)) is in NCNE for any 1/3 ≤ x1 < 1/2. Note that c(s, 6) =
5/12 < 1/2, so this rule is worst-punishing.
(ii) s = (10, 10, 4, 3, 3, 0). We have s3 + s4 = 7 < 10 =
2
6
∑6
i=1 si, so (20) is
satisfied. By equation (21), NCNE occurs whenever 2/7 ≤ x1 < 1/2. This
rule is intermediate since c(s, 6) = 1/2.
(iii) s = (4, 3, 1, 1, 0, 0). We have s3 + s4 = 2 < 3 =
2
6
∑6
i=1 si, so (20) is
satisfied and we have NCNE when x1 = 1/3. So this rule allows only one
symmetric bipositional NCNE. Here we have c(s, 6) = 5/8 > 1/2, so s is
best-rewarding.
The first two rules also allow CNE, so we see that CNE and NCNE can coexist
for the same rule. The third rule, on the other hand, has no CNE.
Finally, we give an example of a bipositional equilibrium in which the number
of candidates is different at the two positions, though the positions themselves
turn out to be symmetrically located.
Example 5.13. Let m = 7. Consider the rule s = (10, 10, 4, 3, 3, 1, 0). Then the
profile ((x1, 4), (x2, 3)) with x1 = 1/3 and x2 = 2/3, is an NCNE. We omit the
details.
6 The four-, five- and six-candidate cases
In the special cases of m = 4 and m = 5 we can provide a complete characterisa-
tion of the rules allowing NCNE. For m = 6 we can identify all types of possible
equilibria.
Theorem 6.1. Given m = 4 and scoring rule s = (s1, s2, s3, s4), NCNE exist if
and only if both the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) c(s, 4) > 1/2,
(b) s1 > s2 = s3.
Moreover, the NCNE is unique and symmetric, with equilibrium profile x =
((x1, 2), (x2, 2)), where
x1 =
1
4
(
s1 − s4
s1 − s2
)
and x2 = 1− x1. (27)
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Proof. By Lemma 3.3, an NCNE with m = 4 must have exactly two distinct
positions, x1 < x2, with n1 = n2 = 2. Hence, by Lemma 3.11, it is necessary that
s2 = s3. By Lemma 3.3, we also need s1 > s2. Hence, (b) is necessary.
By Lemma 3.6, we have 0 < x1 and x2 < 1. By Lemma 3.10, in NCNE we
have v1(x
2+, x−1) ≤ v1(x1−, x−1) = v1(x). That is,
v1(x
2+, x−1) = s1(1− x2) + s2
(
x2 − x1
2
)
+ s4
(
x1 + x2
2
)
≤ s1x1 + s2
(
x2 − x1
2
)
+ s4
(
1− x
1 + x2
2
)
= v1(x
1−, x−1),
which implies s1(1−x1−x2) ≤ s4(1−x1−x2). This is only possible if x1+x2 ≥ 1.
Considering the symmetric moves by candidate 4 gives (1− x1) + (1− x2) ≥ 1 or
x1 + x2 ≤ 1. Hence, x2 = 1− x1.
Then, since v1(x
1−, x−1) = v1(x), we have
s1x
1 + s2
(
x2 − x1
2
)
+
1
2
s4 =
1
4
s1 +
1
2
s2 +
1
4
s4,
from which, after substituting for x2, equation (27) follows. For this to be a valid
position, we need x1 < 1/2, from which it follows that 2s2 < s1 + s4. This is
equivalent to c(s, 4) > 1/2, so (a) is necessary.
For sufficiency, notice that a rule satisfying conditions (a) and (b) also satisfies
the conditions of Theorem 5.10, from which we conclude that the profile given
by (27) is actually in NCNE.
For the five-candidate case, there are two ways to partition the candidates
that might result in an NCNE. As it turns out, one of them is not possible.
Lemma 6.2. For m = 5, there are no NCNE of the form x = ((x1, 2), (x2, 3)).
Proof. First note that, without loss of generality, we can assume s5 = 0, since it
is easy to see that subtracting s5 from each score does not change the rule. By
Lemma 3.11 we have s2 = s3 = s4 and by Lemma 3.3 we have s1 > s2. Hence
our rule is one of those studied in Subsection 5.1. But then by Lemma 5.4 we
cannot have three candidates at position x2.
Theorem 6.3. Given m = 5 and scoring rule s = (s1, s2, s3, s4, s5), NCNE exist
if and only if both the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) c(s, 5) > 1/2,
(b) s1 > s2 = s3 = s4.
Moreover, the NCNE is unique and symmetric, with equilibrium profile x =
((x1, 2), (1/2, 1), (x3, 2)), where
x1 =
1
6
(
s1 + s2
s1 − s2
)
and x3 = 1− x1. (28)
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Proof. As in Lemma 6.2, we lose no generality in assuming s5 = 0. By Lemma
6.2 and 3.3, the profile must be of the form x = ((x1, 2), (x2, 1), (x3, 2)). Also,
s2 = s3 = s4 by Lemma 3.11 and s1 > s2 by Lemma 3.3, so condition (b) is
necessary. By Lemma 3.6, the end points of the issue space are not occupied.
As in the proof of Theorem 6.1, considering moves by candidate 1 to x1− and
x3+, together with Lemma 3.10, gives x1 ≥ 1 − x3. Similar considerations for
candidate 5 give x1 ≤ 1− x3, hence x1 = 1− x3.
Let t ∈ (x1, x2) and t′ ∈ (x2, x3) (all positions in these intervals yield the same
score by Proposition 3.2). Again by Lemma 3.10, we need
v1(t
′, x−1) = s1
(
x3 − x2
2
)
+ s2
(
1− x
3 − x2
2
)
≤ v1(x) = v1(t, x−1) = s1
(
x2 − x1
2
)
+ s2
(
1− x
2 − x1
2
)
,
which implies x3−x2 ≤ x2−x1 and hence 12(x1 +x3) ≤ x2. The same considera-
tions with respect to candidate 5 give that x2 ≤ 12(x1 + x3). So we have equality
and, consequently, x2 = 1/2.
We know that v1(x
1−, x−1) = v1(x) = v1(x1+, x−1). This yields
s1x
1+ s2
(
x3 − x1
2
)
= s1
(
x2 − x1
2
)
+ s2
(
1− x
2 − x1
2
)
,
from which, after substituting x2 = 1/2 and x3 = 1 − x1, equation (28) follows.
For this to be a valid position, we need x1 < x2 = 1/2. This gives s1 > 2s2,
which is equivalent to c(s, 5) > 1/2, so condition (a) is necessary.
Now sufficiency. Suppose (a) and (b) are satisfied. Note that neither candi-
date 1 nor candidate 5 can move into [0, x1), (x1, 1/2), (1/2, x3) or (x3, 1] ben-
eficially. Again, this follows by symmetry and by Lemma 3.10. We check the
remaining possibilities. As
v1(x
2, x−1) =
1
6
s1 +
2
3
s2 = v1(x),
the move by candidate 1 to x2 is not beneficial. Also
v1(x
3, x−1) =
1
6
(s1 − s2)x1 + 1
12
s1 +
3
4
s2 =
1
9
s1 +
7
9
s2 ≤ 1
6
s1 +
2
3
s2 = v1(x),
so there is no reason for candidate 1 to move to x3. By symmetry, then, no moves
by candidate 5 are beneficial.
Finally, consider moves by candidate 3. Any move inside the interval (x1, x3)
does not change her score. A move to a position infinitesimally to the left of x1
gives the requirement
v3(x
1−, x−3) =
1
6
s1 +
2
3
s2 ≤ 1
3
(s1 + s2) = v3(x),
which is satisfied. Finally, if candidate 3 moves to x1 her score is
v3(x
1, x−3) =
1
6
s1 +
2
3
s2 < v3(x).
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By symmetry, then, no moves are beneficial for this candidate. There are no
more moves to consider, hence this is an NCNE.
Thus, in both the four- and five-candidate cases, we see that NCNE exist only
for a subset of best-rewarding rules – those for which all scores except first and
last are equally valuable. In both cases, the amount of dispersion observed in the
candidates’ positions depends on the difference between s1 and s2 and is maximal
when s2 = 0, that is, when the rule is plurality.
As s2 grows towards s1/2, the positions of candidates become less extreme,
converging at the median voter position when s2 = s1/2. As s2 increases beyond
this point, by Theorem 2.4 we know that infinitely many CNE are possible in an
interval that becomes increasingly wide. Hence, there is a bifurcation point that
divides CNE from NCNE when c(s, 4) = 1/2 or c(s, 5) = 1/2. As we move away
from this point, more extreme positions are possible – on one side they take the
form of CNE, and on the other side they are NCNE.7
Since for m > 5 the equilibria are no longer unique even for plurality [11], it
makes sense to describe only their types.
Theorem 6.4. Given m = 6 and scoring rule s = (s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6). Then
there are four possible types of equilibria split in two groups:
{(2, 2, 2), (2, 1, 1, 2)} and {(3, 3), (6)}.
The equilibria of the first group occur for rules s that satisfy
(a) c(s, 6) > 1/2,
(b) s1 > s2 = s3 = s4 = s5.
The equilibria within each group can coexist. No equilibrium of the first group
can coexist with an equilibrium of the second group.
Proof. We have to show that equilibria of types
(2, 4), (2, 1, 3), (3, 1, 2), (4, 2) (29)
do not exist. What they all have in common is that they have two candidates at
one of the extreme positions. Suppose such an equilibrium exists. As before we
note that, without loss of generality, we can assume s6 = 0. By Lemma 3.11 we
have s2 = s3 = s4 = s5 and by Lemma 3.3 we have s1 > s2. Hence, our rule is
one of those studied in Subsection 5.1. But then by Theorem 5.2 we cannot have
three or more candidates at any given position. This rules out all equilibria (29)
7It is curious to note that this equilibrium behaviour shows certain similarities to some of the
equilibria numerically calculated by De Palma et al. [7] using a probabilistic model. When the
level of uncertainty is low (which corresponds roughly to when c(s,m) is large), they observe
NCNE where the candidates are configured as in our NCNE. As the level of uncertainty increases
from zero (the value of c(s,m) decreases), they also observe the candidates’ positions becoming
less extreme. Beyond a certain point, only convergent equilibria are observed. We note, however,
that in addition to these, they also observe other kinds of equilibria that do not arise in our
model.
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and shows that equilibria of the first group are incompatible with equilibria of
the second.
Example 5.12(i) demonstrates that equilibria of the third type exist and may
coexist with CNE as the rule in this case can be worst punishing. Equilibria of
the second type are shown to exist for plurality in [11].
7 Computational Results
We have developed an algorithm to determine whether an NCNE exists for a
given m-candidate scoring rule. The algorithm works by generating a list of all
possible clusterings of the candidates. For each clustering it produces a linear
program (LP). The variables of the LP are the political positions of the clusters.
The LP has the basic constraints to ensure that all of the political positions are
in order and between 0 and 1. Note that a standard LP does not have strict
inequalities, but we can maximise the minimum distance between the positions
so that we will find a solution where clusters have distinct political positions, if
such a solution exists.
The non-trivial constraints are those used to ensure that the candidates cannot
improve their score by switching to a different position. We expand the reals
with political positions x− and x+ that occur immediately before and after each
variable x. For each pair of variables x, y we have three constraints requiring
that the score a candidate would gain from moving from y to x+, x, or x− must
be at most zero. We know that if a candidate can improve their score, they can
improve it by moving to one of these positions. While x− (or x+) is not a real
number, we know that if a candidate can improve their score by moving to x−
they can also improve their score by moving to x−  for a sufficiently small real
number .
This algorithm is not polynomial. Although LP solving can be polynomial,
the number of clusters considered is not polynomial. In spite of this, for the
small sample problems considered in this paper the performance of the algorithm
is close to instantaneous. The algorithm only demonstrates whether a particular
scoring rule gives an NCNE. We intend to adapt the algorithm to use a Quadratic
Constraint solver in place of the LP to allow us to find whether a class of rules
has an NCNE. The class of concave rules will be the prime target.
8 Related Literature
The distinguishing features of this paper are the use of scoring rules and the focus
on multicandidate nonconvergent equilibria. We now briefly describe the related
literature with respect to these aspects.
In light of the probabilistic interpretation of the scoring rule mentioned in the
introduction, we feel the need to emphasise the differences between our approach
and the probabilistic voting literature, which is a huge subject in its own right.
For an introduction to the field, see Coughlin [4] or, for a survey, Duggan [10].
To the best of our knowledge, these works usually involve some distance depen-
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dent function to give the probabilities as, for example, in multinomial logit choice
models. These functions lead to an expected vote share that depends on distance
and does not have discontinuities when candidates’ positions coincide. A scoring
rule, on the other hand, is somewhat simpler: it behaves like a step function that
only depends on ordinal information. Whether the second ranked candidate is
just beyond the first ranked candidate or on the other side of the issue space has
no bearing on the probability of the voter voting for the more distant candidate.
Moreover, the discontinuities associated with the deterministic model persist in
our model. Other models include the stochastic model of Anderson et al. [1]
and Enelow et al. [14]. The former again involves a function depending on dis-
tance, and the latter involves a finite number of voters in a multidimensional
space. De Palma et al. [7] look at a model incorporating uncertainty and nu-
merically calculate equilibria for up to six candidates, comparing them with the
deterministic model. Interestingly, some of the observed equilibria for four and
five candidates show similarities to those we find in our model (see the footnote
following Theorem 6.3).
Scoring rules and similar voting systems have appeared in spatial models be-
fore. However, apart from Cox [5], all the work has been done in somewhat
different contexts. Myerson [17] looks at the incentives inherent in different scor-
ing rules and the political implications for such matters as corruption, barriers
to entry and strategic voting. His model consists of a simpler issue space, with
candidates deciding between two policy positions – “yes” or “no”. In [16], Myer-
son compares various scoring rules with respect to the campaign promises they
encourage candidates to make and, in [18], he investigates scoring rules from
the voter’s perspective in Poisson voting games. Laslier and Maniquet [13] look
at multicandidate elections under approval voting when the voters are strategic.
Myerson and Weber [15] introduce the concept of a “voting equilibrium”, where
voters take into account not only their personal preferences but also whether
contenders are serious, and compare plurality and approval voting in a three-
candidate positioning game similar to ours. We focus only on candidate strate-
gies.
As for the multicandidate aspect, this paper is most closely related to Denzau
et al. [8] and, before them, Eaton and Lipsey [11]. The latter consider plurality
rule, and the former extend these results to “generalised rank functions”. That
is, the candidates’ objectives depend to some degree both on market share and
rank (say, the number of candidates with a larger market share). For a review
emphasising multicandidate competition, see Shepsle [21].
Many other more realistic refinements of the Hotelling model have been con-
structed, incorporating uncertainty, incomplete information, incumbency and un-
derdog effects, and so on. However, the price of added realism is that they are
more complicated, and considering more than two candidates is often intractable.
For a survey focusing on variations of the two candidate case, see Duggan [10] or
Osborne [20].
As for the economic interpretation, our results are related only to those models
in which price competition and transport costs do not come into play, such as in,
again, Eaton and Lipsey [11] and Denzau et al. [8]. The most basic model incor-
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porating price competition is a game of two interdependent stages, the location
selecting stage and the price setting stage. The details can be found in many
standard economics textbooks, such as Vega-Redondo [23, pp. 171–176].
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated how the particular scoring rule in use influ-
ences the candidates’ position-taking behaviour. We have looked at the equilib-
rium properties of a number of different classes of scoring rules. We were able to
identify several broad classes of scoring rules disallowing NCNE completely. For
other large classes, we found that NCNE can exist and we calculated a number
of them.
As Cox [5] and Myerson [17] found previously, the parameter c(s,m) plays a
prominent role in determining what kind of equilibria are possible—as c(s,m)
increases, the amount of dispersion tends to increase also—though usually the
value of c(s,m) is not the only factor of importance. The manner in which the
scores in the score vector are decreasing is pivotal—we saw, for example, that
all rules with entirely convex scores and many with entirely concave scores fail
to possess NCNE. The conditions under which NCNE do exist can at times be
quite stringent, as is made clear by the four- and five-candidate cases.
In his investigation of CNE, Cox [5] found that the value c(s,m) = 1/2 appears
as a cut-off point between existence and nonexistence of CNE: they exist if and
only if c(s,m) ≤ 1/2, i.e., when the rule is worst-punishing. When there are
four or five candidates, a similar phenomenon occurs with respect to NCNE: only
when c(s,m) > 1/2 may NCNE exist, though, as mentioned above, it is not
guaranteed. Thus, the two kinds of equilibrium are mutually exclusive. When
there are six or more candidates, however, this transition from CNE to NCNE
is no longer clear-cut. There exist worst-punishing and intermediate rules that
allow both types of equilibria, as seen in Theorem 5.10.
A number of questions remain open. Though we have investigated a wide vari-
ety of scoring rules, these are by no means all of them. The equilibrium behaviour
of many rules—most notably concave ones—remains unknown. On the other
hand, many of the rules most frequently appearing in the literature—plurality,
Borda, k-approval and so on—fall nicely into the cases we have considered. An-
other point of interest: most NCNE discovered in this paper by theoretical con-
siderations have been ones in which the same number of candidates locate at each
position. The mechanics behind less regular or asymmetric equilibria obtained
as a result of computational experiments remains unclear. It is interesting that a
class of weakly concave rules can have only highly asymmetric equilibria. Hence a
concave rule may have only asymmetric equilibria or none at all. At this point it
is unknown whether any concave rules actually permit such asymmetric NCNE.
Of course, there are a number of simplifications in our framework in compari-
son to Cox’s one. The main one is the assumption that the voters are uniformly
distributed along the issue space, though this was partially justified in the first
footnote of Section 2. Cox’s [5] characterisation of CNE holds for an arbitrary
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nonatomic distribution of voter ideal points. The existence of NCNE, however,
is much more vulnerable to changes in the distribution. In a similar framework,
Osborne [19] finds that, for plurality rule, the uniform distribution is a special
case—“almost all” other distributions exclude the possibility of NCNE. It would
be interesting to see whether our results can be adapted to other distributions.
Another limiting assumption is the unidimensionality of the issue space. Cox [5]
provides a version of Theorem 2.4 for a multidimensional space. Whether our
results on NCNE can be extended to this situation is also not known.
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